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The Limits ot National
Diversity: The Origins and
Future ot the Modern
Corporation
By Kristine Gr1gorian, Michael Murff, and Robert Shull
Edited by Professor John Griffin
o nation-states still represent democracy's
preserves the liberty of the people and the diversity
great hope? Or are they in decline? After a
of national practice-preserved by the people's free
century of adolescence marked by statechoice of policy - but is justified because the oribuilding and aggressive colonial expansion,
gins of private power themselves lie in the public
Western nations grew up into an era of world wars.
sphere.
Since this tragic time, some argue,] both the powers
This paper evaluates the national diversity
of and faith in national government have diminargument by taking seriously this last, important
ished. In our day, giant multinational corporations
claim: namely, that corporate institutions and the
with tens of thousands of employees working
private power they generate are based on public
around the globe have arisen as powerful nationless
origins, public foundations, and public choice. The
actors in the international sphere. Currency traders
paper does so by examining a brief history of the
and securities markets punish nations that
~--~
corporation, together with a history of the
fail to do their bidding.
capital markets critical to its birth, to
While some embrace this changed
determine just how closely these imporworld, others fear this globalization of
tant economic institutions are wed to
business interests as a threat to democranational history and the mechanisms of
tic sovereignty. These scholars warn
state power. The paper argues that coragainst the new skepticism of government
porate legal innovation and institutional
(Berger and Dore 1996, 9). A truly
development have always been governed by
autonomous private sphere, they argue,
extra-national processes. Those who reduce the
should be distrusted because there are no guarantees shape of private forces to national politics fail to see
of the civil liberties so dear to democratic societies.
how the modem corporation is both a product of
If implemented correctly, democratic government
and transcendent of the modem nation-state.
brings liberty and prosperity and propels the ascent
ORIGINS OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND
of science and spread of technology. Without government-funded research centers and higher educaCORPORATIONS
tion, for example, would the technology of today
Securities markets, the first modem institution of capitalism, developed well before the formahave been developed by the private corporations of
tion of nations or nation-states (Ayling 1986,44).
yesterday? The skeptics of globalization argue that
the circumscription of corporate power not only
Already in 1305 there was a type of money lending
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lFor example, K. Ohmae. 1995. The end of the nation state: The rise of regional economies. New York: Free Press.
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activity in France, although the first modem form of
the stock market originated in Amsterdam about
1550 (Kent 1973, 111). The London Stock
Exchange first traded stocks informally in 1620. All
these markets developed before the treaty of
Westphalia was signed in 1648, which ushered the
nation-state onto the international stage.
From the beginning, market innovations
tended to spread regardless of language, cultural or
political boundaries. 2 The trading of stock began in
Amsterdam. Men of commerce in other countries
soon imitated this Dutch institution. London openly
imitated and then modified the Dutch practice of
trading stock such as in 1714 when John Freke posted a list of stocks and their prices on the door of
Jonathan's Coffee House for the public to see
(BraudeI1982, 97-lO6). This practice soon spread
to other nations. The first German exchange was
founded in 1568 (Ayling 1986,6; Gowdy 1982,6).
However, not until about 1815 after the Napoleonic
wars spread the knowledge of stock markets did this
largely barter-and-goods exchange develop into a
true securities market.
In contrast to markets, the early precursor to
the corporation, the joint-stock company, was a distinctly political innovation spread by distinctly
political ambitions. The earliest joint-stock companies were colonial companies, designed to influence
and control territories targeted by absolutist states
such as Russia and Holland, as well as mercantilist
nation states such as England (Kindleberger 1993,
191-3). The largest joint stock companies became
very powerful as the government granted monopoly
privileges to them and then used them to develop
and subdue large territories such as India and parts
of Africa. Later in the 19th Century, colonization
was the chief impetus behind the adoption of limited partnerships and the modem form of the corporation in powerful, industrializing nations such as
Germany (Koberg 1992,35-153).
Nevertheless, the early corporate economy
flourished outside the political realm, even if in
dubious circumstances. For example, in the 17th
and 18th centuries a vast majority of companies
were never legally incorporated. Some traders used
old charters or charters from bankrupt companies to
start new ones. These companies themselves fre-

quently became bankrupt or were used to swindle
investors (Morgan and Thomas 1969,37).
Sometimes such scandals caused widespread financial panic. As these illegal companies began to
flood the market and steal investors from the bigger
joint stock companies, states were forced to reexamine the corporate economy as a vital interest.
Government regulation soon curbed the
growth of joint-stock companies. Governments
became alarmed at financial panic, which had the
potential to shake them to their foundations, and
drew up plans to closely regulate all companies. An
important early regulation was the Bubble Act of
1720, which prohibited unchartered companies from
trading their stock or assuming other privileges of
incorporated entities. The English Parliament
passed this law on June 23,1720, and in the same
year the French passed a similar law that required
rigid standards for licensing (Werner and Smith
1915,98). Nevertheless, despite these efforts merchants and stock jobbers found tricks to circumvent
legal strictures, and a large number of businesses
flourished outside the law. From the beginning, private initiative wrestled the joint stock company
from its early political origins into a largely
ungoverned-and most definitely publicly undetermined-realm.

A TWIN BIRTH:

THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

THE MODERN NATION-STATE

The modem nation-state developed after the
rise of the joint-stock company and the stock market; however, the modem corporation was born
joined at the hip with the modem nation-state.
Although the Treaty of Westphalia ushered in the
era of the nation-state, it was not until after the
French Revolution that the nation-state was transformed into its modem form, with greatly expanded
powers to tax, conscript and regulate. The modem
form of the nation state included strong national
bureaucracies governed by administrative law, popular nationalistic loyalties, and a comprehensive
national legal code administered by a nationallyorganized legal system.
Although the development of the previously
discussed monetary institutions was largely independent from the nation-state, the development of

2For an interesting discussion of institutional transfer, see E. Powell. 1915. The evolution of money markets
1385-1915. London: London Financial News. The Royal Exchange was the most successful of the early stock
markets because of conducive British political climate. marchants from Amsterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Paris,
Bordeaux, Venice, and Vienna all met in London to conduct their business. Powell cites an observation of a then
prominent merchant, "at every tum a man is [reminded] of Babal, [owing to] such confusion of tongues."
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the modem corporation, with limited liability and
non-concessionary incorporation procedures, was
not. These innovations required the institutions of
state ushered in by the Napoleonic Code to function
properly. As the new institutions of state spread, so
too did a new era for the corporation. Throughout
the 19th Century, both in young nation states such
as the United States and Japan, and in the older
European countries with older laws and ideas, the
corporate economy flourished like never before.
Just as during the old era, modem times were
marked by borrowing of ideas and laws across
national boundaries.
So with the new institutions of state came
new institutions of economic organization. France
provides an excellent example. During the French
revolution the Paris bourse (stock exchange) was
closed and public companies were discouraged.
After Napoleon's rise to power, companies were
once again allowed to form according to the new
commercial code (Cameron 1961, 30). This commercial code, established in 1808 with the
Napoleonic Code, allowed for three types of companies that had never before been established: the
societe anonyme, societe en nom collectif, and the
societe en commandite. The societe anonyme (S.A.)
was the first modem company that granted limited
liability to owners, and a modification of the societe
en nom collectifthat imitated the S.A.'s practice of
share trading led to the first widespread, non-concessionary system of incorporation (Freedeman
1979, 47-65). Incorporation was no longer a privilege granted by the government; it was open to anyone who followed the rules.
As the modem nation-state became a model
for the rest of Europe and the world, so too did the
modem corporation. The liberalized French system
was mimicked by many other European nations,
especially those that had been conquered by
Napoleon. Fearful of being left behind, England
also liberalized incorporation. In 1825, the English
Parliament repealed the Bubble Act, and gave companies the right to freely incorporate again in forms
much like those found in France. The Companies
Act of 1856 accelerated the process, and in the
l860s France liberalized the incorporation of S.A.s
themselves (Cameron 1961,35). By this time the
old joint-stock companies had faded into the pages
of history and companies began to adopt the basic
governance forms found in today's corporations.
Even as the corporation became standard
throughout Europe, nations continued to borrow
innovations from one another. Of course one of the
most important innovations that was copied was

limited liability. By the 1870s, all major European
powers had laws for limited liability corporations.
Much of this national law was directly copied. In
fact the French law was adopted word for word by
Spain in 1869. In 1870 the North German
Confederation did the same thing. Over less than a
generation, the French law was imitated by
Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and Austria
(Cameron 1961,35-40).
Not all countries followed this same dynamic. In the United States, the right of incorporation
had been reserved for the states in the Constitutional
Convention, but this power was not widely used by
the state legislatures. Only 200 companies had been
incorporated by the tum of the century. During this
time, state legislatures were accused of corruption
in using the incorporation power. As a consequence,
several states liberalized their incorporation laws,
allowing companies to be incorporated without specific legislative approval. North Carolina (1792) led
the way, and was soon followed by Massachusetts
(1799) and New York (1811) (Henn and Alexander
1983,25).
Institutional transfer proceeded in the U.S.
just as in Europe, but by a different and even
stronger mechanism. Some states, especially the
smaller ones, began to liberalize their laws even further in an effort to gain tax revenue by enticing
companies to incorporate in their state. As soon as
one state liberalized their laws, another state would
follow suit to keep businesses from incorporating
elsewhere. Thus, competition drove liberalization to
extreme degrees (Romano 1993,65).
A key step in the development of this competitive dynamic was the decision by the Supreme
Court that states could not prevent businesses incorporated in other states from doing business in their
state. In Paul v. Virginia, the United States Supreme
Court decided that under the interstate commerce
clause a state had no power to exclude a corporation
from doing business in its state if that corporation
was chartered elsewhere. This decision meant that
corporations could shop for the most advantageous
incorporation laws, basing their decision solely on
the governance advantages of those incorporation
laws. Corporations did not have to worry about regulatory penalties from other states where they
planned to do their actual business (Romano 1993,
26). Competitive pressures arising from Paul v.
Virginia thus took away regulatory autonomy. Gone
were states' powers to fully regulate the charters of
those companies doing business in their economies.
Nevertheless, the role of the state in the
growth of the modem corporation in the U.S. should
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not be underestimated. The growth of U.S. capital
markets, a key prerequisite to the growth and spread
of the modem corporation, was highly dependent on
public action. Favorable government treatment of
the railroads and public investment dollars in such
large technologies spurred some of the most important examples of equity financing during the 19th
century. What is perhaps more important, govemment sales of bonds to finance the Civil War greatly
increased the volume of American securities markets. The buying and selling of bonds provided a
huge boost to markets, an effect that was mimicked
elsewhere, such as with the London Stock Exchange
during the Crimean War.
We see, therefore, that the state played a critical role in the development of the modem corporation. Innovations in state-building and government
not only brought on the institutional innovations
required for the birth modem corporation, but state
action greatly accelerated corporate growth and
development.
THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL CHOICE
The modem corporation is a product of rules
that came about with the innovations and procedures of modem state-building. However, the corporation was spread by extra-national imitation of
rules and practices across national boundaries. The
new nation states pushed each country to develop
far more independently, organizing domestic interests and institutions according to their own peculiar
patterns of national choice. Nevertheless, the autonomy nations exercised over the development of this
critical institution of capitalism, the modem corporation, was limited.
One of the key ways the corporation has
spread is through legal harmonization. Each nationstate has its own rules and regulations by which
companies organize themselves and act. While the
laws are not always the same and each nation has its
peculiarities, nations have established common
ground so that businesses can carry on trade. Today,
legal harmonization of corporate code continues,
providing a key pressure in many countries toward
integrating their economies into the world economy.
An excellent historical example of this
process of harmonization is Japan. During the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, several ofthe daimyo or local
rulers overthrew the Shogun and returned power to
the Emperor Meiji. One of the important changes
the reformers made was to bring the laws and regulations in alignment with those of the western
nations with whom Japan had been doing business.
Western nations had demanded that Japan update its
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commercial code so that foreign businesses could
understand and compete-or sanctions would follow.
Japan complied (Hirschmeir and Yui 1981,73).
Like Japan of the 1860s, today only a nation-state
that is willing to be punished economically can disregard the pressure to harmonize.
Harmonization can quickly lead to legal standardization, or institutional convergence, and history shows us how. The United States' experience, far
from being an exception, might point the way here.
Much like the dynamic that developed after Paul v.
Virginia, there might well come a time, if it is not
already here, when companies will begin to choose
which country they wish to incorporate in. It will
not matter in what country they incorporate because
they will be able to do business anywhere on the
globe. Then nations will begin to liberalize their
own laws and encourage companies to incorporate
so that they will gain tax revenue and retain some
modicum of control over such corporations.
Eventually the dynamic that is seen in America
could be seen throughout the entire world. Modem
corporate law, although once the product of national
politics, has never been absolutely determined by it;
in the future, what influence nation states retain
over the rules of the corporation could very well
largely disappear.
CONCLUSION

Those who interpret the global economy
either as an illusion that hides the true, national origins of private power, or as a new threat to political
choice and democracy, misinterpret the lessons of
history. Those lessons show that although the
nation-state and the modem corporation were born
at the same moment and as consequences of similar
innovations in state-building, law and administration, the dynamic of institutional change and transformation that both preceded and followed the birth
of the corporation was often extra-national. Legal
harmonization and institutional transfer have always
limited national diversity and with it national choice
of institutional possibilities-although these forces
have never eliminated these ideals. In other words,
the forces of globalization have been with us since
the beginnings of the modern age, and will undoubtedly continue, possibly intensifying. Whether this
spells the end of nation-states and their traditional
roles in the global economy is still an unanswered
question. History does teach us that if the future is
like the past, national autonomy will at least be limited.
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